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The State as a Shareholder:
A Study of Partial
Privatization and its Impacts
on Corporate Governance in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Dr. Meshal Khalil Faraj 

Abstract:
Different studies show that partially privatized firms outperform their
private peers in Saudi Arabia. Ownership of Saudi government of publicly
traded companies may be feasible economically, but legally creates a hard
case. The literature of corporate governance is still unable to absorb the
implications of government ownership. This study attempts to examine those
implications and its impacts on jurisdictions featuring dual judicial legal
systems (administrative and civil courts) through presenting Saudi Arabia case.
The Saudi government adopts the single tier board structure. Under this
structure, only shareholders are entitled to elect board of directors. When the
government holds a controlling stake, its leverage over a firm’s affairs is
difficult to challenge. Shedding lights on the Saudi experiment with
government ownership, this study attempts to answer two questions that
result from government ownership: procedurally, which court will review the
government’s actions, the administrative court or commercial court?
Substantially, what law will govern these actions?
The available evidence on the performance of firms partly owned by the
government emphasizes the efficiency of government ownership. This implies
that when the government exercises its rights as a shareholder it acts in a
business-like capacity. Therefore, this study finds that its actions would be
reviewed by the Commercial Courts and the Companies Act (Saudi Corporate
Law) applies to it. Although there are no lawsuits against the government as a
 Department of Business Administration, College of Economics and Administrative Sciences
Al- Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
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shareholder supporting this conclusion, but analyzing current regulations and
rules would draw this conclusion.
Finally, this article sketches policy implications scrutinizing potential
proposals aimed at eliminating the complications of state intervention in the
stock market.
Introduction:
On November 2, 2014 Saudi Arabia's National Commercial Bank (NCB)
closed the sale of 300 million shares priced at 45 riyals ($12) each to Saudi
Arabian retail investors.(1) The sale was the largest in the Arab world and the
year's second-biggest IPO after Chinese e-commerce giant company Alibaba
Group Holding Ltd. raised a record $25 billion.(2) The Public Investment Fund, a
state-run investment fund that owns a majority of the bank, sold a 15% stake
to the retail investors and allocated a 10% stake to the Public Agency Fund.(3)
The NCB sale is the most recent privatization effort in Saudi Arabia aimed at
re-distributing wealth and, more importantly, enhancing the role of the private
sector. Despite these goals, privatization actually reinvents the government as
a shareholder. An examination of previous privatization sales shows that
partial privatization is the most-used method of selling off stock, which
enhances the contribution of private actors in the privatized firms but does not
eliminate the role of the government .It may be feasible economically, but
legally it creates a hard case.
Most shares held by the Saudi government are managed through agencies
and public funds. These agencies and funds fall within the definition of public

(1) Matthew Martin and Sarmad Khan, Saudi Arabia's NCB Seen Surging after IPO is Discounted,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, Nov. 11, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-1111/saudi-arabia-s-ncb-seen-surging-after-ipo-is-discounted.
(2) Ahmed Al Omran, Saudi NCB's $6 Billion IPO Heavily Oversubscribed, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Nov. 6, 2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-ncbs-6-billion-ipo-heavilyoversubscribed-1415265892; BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, supra note 1.
(3) Ahmed Al Omran, Saudi Arabia to Sell 15% of National Commercial Bank in IPO, THE WALL
STREET
JOURNAL:
MIDDLE
EAST
REAL
TIME
(Mar.
2,
2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2014/03/02/saudi-arabia-to-sell-15-of-national-commercialbank-in-ipo/.
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administration.(4) Traditionally, legal scholars assume that public actors
operate within public laws boundaries, such as administrative law, which are
designed for serving public interest. When they act as shareholders, therefore,
public entities practically operate in a different legal context and,
consequently, may have a different set of priorities.
The arguments against government ownership, in general, link it to
inefficiencies and the waste of resources.(5) Within the corporate law
literature, much ink has been spilled to probe the government ownership of
publicly traded firms and its consequences.(6) The fundamental riddle to
existing corporate law scholarship is to identify an appropriate structure of
accountability that would govern actions of the government and its agencies as
shareholders. Corporate law as a private law is ill-equipped to absorb the
government’s actions. Although previous studies have enhanced our
understanding of different aspects of the government ownership of private
(4) AYOUB M. AL JARBOU, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS UNDER THE SAUDI LAW 180 (2011)
(citing Board of Grievances [The Administrative Court in Saudi Arabia] decision number 424/T/3,
1410 A.H. (1990), which declared that “the establishment of independent Administrative
Agencies has been carried out in Saudi Arabia by Royal decrees…”) For example, the Public
Investment Fund was established according to the Royal Decree No. (M/24) dated 1391 AH
(1971) (Arabic).
(5) See for example Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 15-17 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6665, 1998) (citing Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vashny,
Politicians and Firms, Q. J. ECON. (1994); Morten Bennedsen, Political Ownership (U. Aarhus CLS,
Working Paper No. 98-009, 1998)) (stating that “[g]overnments have used their control of state
firms and other assists as a means of channeling these benefits, by enforcing excess
employment at state firms and agencies, creating government projects that transfer wealth to
supporters, and so on. In other words, state firms are inefficient… because inefficiency is the
result of the government’s deliberate policy to transfer resources to supporters”).
(6) For examples of this literature, see studies discussing intervention of the U.S. government in
the stock market during the financial crisis see e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the
Government is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. Rev. 1293 (2011); J.W. Verret, Treasury
Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010);
Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009); Matthew R. Shahabian, the Government as
Shareholder and Political Risk: Procedural Protections in the Bailout, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 351 (2011).
Other studies focus on the impact of government ownership on corporate governance. See
Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM. L. REV. 2917
(2012); Li-Wen Lin, State Ownership and Corporate Governance in China: An Executive Career
Approach, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 743 (2013).
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firms, they have not described the impact of government ownership in
jurisdictions featuring dual judicial legal systems. The nature of the dilemma
that the government ownership poses in jurisdiction with dual judicial legal
systems has two dimensions: procedurally, what court will review the
government’s actions? Substantially, what law will govern these actions? The
experience of Saudi Arabia provides a convenient lens with which to inspect
these impacts and stands as an example for developing countries.
In jurisdictions of dual judicial legal system, disputes involving a public
agency are adjudicated in an independent administrative court. This rule has
an exemption: the public agency's action will fall outside the jurisdiction of the
administrative court if it acts without exercising its capacity as a public
authority.
In Saudi Arabia, a dual judicial legal system jurisdiction, the rule is that the
Board of Grievances (Diwan Almadhalim) (Administrative Court) has
jurisdiction over cases involving a public agency only if it acts with exercising its
capacity as a public authority. Conversely, if the agency acts without exercising
that capacity, the action will be adjudicated in a non-administrative court.
This article argues that although Saudi agencies and public funds managing
government shares are legally defined as government entities, their business
actions as shareholders should be reviewed by the Commercial Courts. Article
35(c) of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007 grants the Commercial Courts
jurisdiction over "disputes occurring among partners in partnerships." (7)
Although there is no single case against the government as a shareholder
underpinning this conclusion, this article argues that this provision is
formulated in broad enough language to give judges solid ground to adjudicate
such disputes.
Substantially, state intervention in the stock market raises concerns over
the effectiveness of the Companies Act (“the Act”) to govern the actions of

(7) The Law of the Judiciary, Royal Decree No. (M/78) dated 19/9/1428 AH (2007) (the Law of
the Judiciary of 2007" hereafter) (Arabic). Article 85 of the new Law of Judiciary states that:
“This Law shall supersede the Law of the Judiciary issued by Royal Decree No. M/64 dated
14/07/1395 H (1975)”.
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state agencies and public funds.(8) The thrust of the concern is that the Act,
which is a part of corporate governance law,(9) is designed to govern private
activities and emphasizes the wealth maximization of shareholders as its main
principle.(10) On the other hand, the public interest is the tenet of state action.
The two objectives sometimes are contradictory. Theoretically, the public
interest should have superior footing over private interests. This assumes that
the government funds would consistently favour the public interest in cases
where wealth maximization would be inconsistent with the public interest.
Practically, this article cites studies showing that partially privatized firms
outperform private rivals,(11) which provides insight into how these funds and
government agencies operate on a business basis and abandon the aims of the
government bureaucracy. It is evidence that these government entities are
able to operate within the Act’s boundaries. However, it is still legitimate to
argue that privatized firms had monopolized industries for many years, but
overemphasizing this distorts the reality of the privatized firms' performance.

(8) The Companies Act created by Royal Decree No. M/6 of 1385 AH corresponding to 1965. On
November 9, 2015 the Saudi Arabian Council of Ministries approved the long-anticipated
Companies Act (“the Act”). The new law came into force 150 days after publication in the
Official Gazette. The new Companies Act introduces new provisions and amends some existing
provisions. Although amendments cover different aspect of provisions governing publicly traded
companies, it leaves many defects unchanged. For example, it does not define the concept of
control nor the duties of a controlling shareholder. See NEW SAUDI ARABIAN COMPANIES LAW
http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2015/11/new_saudi_arabiancompanieslaw.html (last
visit
11\20\2015);
NEW
SAUDI
ARABIAN
COMPANIES
LAW
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/middleeast/insights/publications/2015/11/new-saudi-arabiancompanies-law/ (last visit 11\20\2015).
(9) James A Fanto, the Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance, 31 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 31, 32 (1998).
(10) It should be noted that Capital Market Authority issued the Corporate Governance
Regulations which constitutes guiding principles for all publicly traded companies. Even the
Regulations have mandatory articles, most provisions replicate provisions of the Act. Therefore,
this Article will primarily focus on the Act as a part of the corporate governance structure. For
more information about the Corporate Governance Regulations it is available at:
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/CORPORATE%20GOVERNANCE.pdf
(last
visit
11\20\2015).
(11) Abuzar M. A. Eljelly, Ownership and Firm Performance: The Experience of Saudi Arabia’s
Emerging Economy, INT’L BUS. & ECON. RES. J., 26 (2009); Ahmed Alanazi, Benjamin Liu & John
Forster, Saudi Arabian IPOs and Privatized Firms Profitability, REV. MIDDLE E. ECON. FIN. 1 (2011).
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Not only does being a shareholder raise concerns, state ownership also
carries doctrinal concerns regarding controlling positions. Due to the size of its
shareholdings, the Saudi government is a controlling shareholder in a number
of listed companies. In the corporate law literature, controlling is a substantial
concept since it influences business decision making. Unfortunately, the Act
does not contain an efficient accountability structure governing the actions of
controlling shareholders.
Most recently, the Kingdom opened its stock market to foreign investors. (12)
The underlying aim of this economic liberalization is to “grow its institutional
investment base… promote market stability, and reduce volatility.” (13)
Attracting foreign capital is a major objective of every country, but it is
unachievable if investors feel that there is no protection against the
government, as a controlling shareholder, from expropriating company
assets.(14) This article suggests that Saudi policymakers should impose rigorous
obligations on controlling shareholders. These obligations should be binding on
both state and private shareholders. The justification for such equal treatment
is that the existing regulatory vacuum was not wrought by state ownership,
but is an inherent defect of the Act’s structure.
Part I of this article outlines the structure of the Saudi economy and the role
of the state in that economy. An overview of the Saudi economy provides
insight into the role of the government in the economy and explains how this
role has expanded over the years, backed by oil revenue. It then shows how
the setback of oil prices in the 1980s forced the government to adopt a
strategy of investing oil surpluses.
Part II lays out the process that led to the state being a shareholder. It
reveals that privatization program is not the only vehicle that places the
government in the stock market but is the main process of reinventing the role
(12) Foreign investors were allowed to invest in the market through swaps. Ahmed Al Omran &
Nikhil Lohade, Saudi Arabia to Open its Stock to Foreign Investors On June 15, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, April 16, 2015.
(13) Alanna Petroff, Saudi Arabia Opens Up its Stock Market… but not to you, CNN MONEY, June
15, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/15/investing/saudi-arabia-market-open/.
(14) Meshal Faraj, Toward New Corporate Governance Standards in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia: Lessons from Delaware, 159 (Aug. 14, 2013) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Widener
University Delaware Law School) (on file with author).
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of government shareholders. It finds that, although the Saudi government
directly holds shares in privatized firms, most of the government shareholdings
are managed through agencies and public funds. This part also sheds lights on
the performance of these firms following partial privatization. A performance
evaluation enables a comparison with private rivals and considers the
economic feasibility of state ownership.
The influence of a state shareholder owes much to its ownership strategy.
Part III of this article analyzes ownership structures and government ownership
strategies in Saudi Arabia, focusing primarily on the Saudi single-tier board
governance system and how this style of governance allows a state
shareholder to effectively dominate business decisions. This part explores
which duties of controlling shareholders could be imposed on the state when it
falls within that definition. The analysis implies that a controller has no legal
constraints on her or his actions. Then, discussion turns toward Shariah law,
which is the national law of Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to determine to what
extent Shariah can restrain the actions of controlling shareholders.
Part IV outlines the structure of Saudi Arabia’s judicial system and considers
what court would have jurisdiction over disputes involving state shareholders.
The lack of judicial precedents dictates a reliance on assumptions and analysis.
This analysis is confined to the jurisdictions of the Board of Grievances and of
the Commercial Courts, which are the courts most likely to adjudicate such
disputes. From there, this article examines different assumptions and
determines that such disputes will land in the lap of the Commercial Courts.
Part V attempts to sketch policy implications suggesting Saudi lawmakers
consider imposing duties on controlling shareholders, whether public or
private. It then scrutinizes potential proposals aimed at eliminating the
complications of state intervention in the stock market. The first proposal is
premised on full privatization and transferring the whole ownership of stateowned firms to the private sector. Though this is a simple remedy and would
wipe out the presence of the state in the market, it is impractical since it
ignores the size of the government’s investments in the equity market. The
second proposal is to maintain the status quo. It proposes that the existing
legal system for governing companies’ affairs, which is mainly the Act, does not
distinguish between private or public actors and all cases arising out of the
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Act’s provisions would be litigated before the Commercial Courts.
Furthermore, the article’s findings highlight wealth maximization as the chief
strategy of public funds and state agencies.
The article concludes with a brief review of the outcome of the partial
privatization process. It observes that mixed ownership still triggers the Act's
provisions. It argues that the performance of privatized firms reflects a
tendency toward the principle of wealth maximization.
I- The Saudi Economy
The Kingdom has an oil-based economy with strong government dominance
over major economic activities.(15) It possesses roughly 20% of the world’s
proven petroleum reserves and ranks as the largest exporter and producer of
petroleum in the world.(16) Petroleum revenue accounts for 90% of total
government income and roughly 88% of total export revenues.(17) 35% of Saudi
Arabia’s GDP comes from the oil sector.(18)
With constant reliance on the surplus resulting from petroleum activities, oil
plays a central role in government spending. Saudi government activities take
two forms: public investments, which are carried out by government-related
firms, and government expenditures.(19) Government expenditures can be
categorized into two types: current and capital.(20) Current expenditures refer
to wages, sales, transfers, subsidies, and other expenses (i.e., consumption).(21)
Capital expenditures include government spending on reinforcing human
resources, providing social services and healthcare, developing economic
resources, and increasing the availability of municipal and housing services.(22)
(15) Saudi Arabia, Economy Overview, http://www.pabm-ec.com/saudi-arabia.php (last visit
6/14/2014).
(16) Id.
(17) Saad A. Alshahrani & Ali J. Alsadiq, Economic Growth and Government Spending in Saudi
Arabia: An Empirical Investigation 5 (IMF Working Paper No. WP/14/3, 2014), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41203.0 (last visit 6/14/2014).
(18) Id.
(19) Id.
(20) Id.
(21) Id. at Chapter 4 (discussing the budget, which includes development programs and
projects).
(22) Id.
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As in other developing countries, the government sets the goals and guiding
policies of both public and private resources to achieve the objectives of
development.(23) Although the private sector had initially been supported by
the government in line with its pro-business orientation, government
intervention in formerly private activities replaced private efforts during times
of booming oil revenues.(24)In turn, government intervention in the economy
undermines the role of the private sector. The development plan reflects this
ambivalence.(25) The ambivalence stems from constant, substantial
government intervention with no significant role for the private sector. This
puts the government in a position of assuming economic functions that could
have been filled by the private sector.
Speaking historically, the development plans explicitly emphasize economic
diversification, but it will not be an easy task.(26) The Kingdom will rely largely
on hydrocarbon natural resources and their derivatives for economic output as
well as public finance.(27) This dependence subjects fiscal policy to the mercy of
cyclical and unpredictable developments in the world’s oil markets.(28)

(23) MOHAMED A. RAMADY, THE SAUDI ARABIAN ECONOMY: POLICIES, ACHIEVEMENTS, AND CHALLENGES 206
(2d ed. 2010). (looking at five areas where the government relation to the private sector have
evolved over time. These areas are: the government as planner, the government as financing
entity, the government as buyer and seller, the government as regulator, and the government
as revenue collector.)
(24) Hannah Linnemann, Politics and Business in Saudi Arabia: Characteristics of an Interplay,
PARIS
SCH.
INT'L
AFF.
9
(2015),
available
at:
http://www.sciencespo.fr/psia/sites/sciencespo.fr.psia/files/LINNEMANN_Hannah.pdf (last visit
7/16/2016).
(25) Wafa Al-Rushaid, Strengthening of National Capacities for National Development Strategies
and Their Management: An Evaluation of UNDP's Contribution: Country Study- Saudi Arabia,
United
Nations
Development
Programme
(July
2010),
http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/cd/Saudi-Arabia.pdf (last visit 7/16/2016)
(explaining that "Saudi Arabia has a long tradition of planning for development. A five- year plan
produced by the Ministry of Economy and planning… This document is to be used as an
indicative guidance for public resource allocation and to enable the private sector devise better
forecasting of where the public spending will go")., see also Ramady, supra note 23, at 16.
(26) Ramady, id, at 15-16.
(27) Id, at 16.
(28) Id.
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After suffering a drop in oil prices during the 1980s, the Kingdom took a
transformative approach: the investment of reserves has been the new
strategy for the government. This approach entails greater reliance on
institutional investors: the sovereign wealth fund (SWF) and pension funds
were an appropriate conduit. These institutional investors tend to invest in
bonds and equities at home.(29)
These funds gradually outgrew their original purpose to take a significant
role in the economy. In 2008, for instance, the government established a more
adventurous investment arm, Sanabil.(30) It holds assets of almost five billion
dollars, andits aims include the diversification of the economy and the creation
of jobs.(31) The nature of the objectives of Sanabil and other public funds
implicitly dictates a focus on long-term investments. The effect of these public
funds is to aggrandize the scale of government intervention in the economy.
II- State Ownership of Publicly Traded Companies
A. Setting the Stage
In June 2002, the Supreme Economic Council approved the objectives and
policies of the privatization strategy in Saudi Arabia.(32) The privatization
strategy comprises various methods of privatizing public enterprises. One of
these methods, the most common, takes the form of sale contracts under
(29) Saudi Arabia’s Investments: Oil-Fuelled Caution, THE ECONOMIST, May 24, 2014.
(30) Id.
(31) Id.
(32) See the Privatization Strategy at the Supreme Economic Council’s webpage,
http://www.sec.gov.sa/getdoc/bf0267b5-d3f3-42e0-87a2c80c7227d3ca/Privatization_Strategy.aspx (last visit 4/4/2014). On April 25, 2016 Saudi Arabia
unveiled Saudi Vision 2030 to reduce the Kingdom's reliance on oil. The Vision involves
regulatory, budget and policy changes that will be carried out over the next 15 years. To achieve
the Vision, the government has adopted transformative programs including a comprehensive
privatization program. Although the Visions did not set out privatization methods, in light of
previous privatizations process it is expected to be a partial privatization program. This implies
more government's presence in the stock market. The Vision's webpage is available at:
http://vision2030.gov.sa/en; see also Saudi Arabia Unveils 15-Year Plan to Transform its
Economy at: http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/25/saudi-arabias-government-officially-unveilslong-term-economic-plan.html CNBC, April 25, 2016; and What's in Saudi Arabia's Blueprint for
Life after Oil?: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-25/key-elements-of-saudiarabia-s-blueprint-for-life-post-oil BLOOMBERG, April 26, 2016.
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which the government may directly sell to the private sector or to a principal
investor.(33) Partial sales to the private sector is the main method of making the
government a shareholder. Therefore, this paper will focus on this rather than
other methods of privatization.
Before June 2002, all enterprises slated for asset privatization were
governmental entities or institutions. Some were governed by their own
particular legal systems and some were incorporated under the Act. For
instance, in September 1976, Royal Decree No. 66 created the Saudi Basic
Industries Corporation (SABIC).(34) Its articles of incorporation state that the
Saudi government is the only founder.(35) The Decree defined SABIC as a public
corporation subject to the Act. The Act’s governance system adopts a singletier board style under which boards of directors are granted exclusive power to
manage a firm. Even though the Act incorporates directors’ duties, directors
should not be afraid that their business decisions would be contested in court
since the government was the only shareholder.
Prior to privatization, government ownership replaced market forces with
weak governance mechanisms. Most of the managers of state-owned firms
were civil servants who lacked real business talent.(36) A further insufficiency
can be found in their inactive behaviour regarding governance. These
managers were highly risk averse and had no incentive to venture into risky
business operations.(37) Put differently, they lacked any desire to maximize the
value of their enterprises.
One of privatization’s objectives is to develop capital markets and create
new mechanisms for mobilizing capital.(38) The Saudi government achieved this
(33) Methods of privatization also include: management contracts, leasing contracts, and
financing contracts. See:
http://www.sec.gov.sa/getdoc/6692a402-1a0a-442e-a378e16c9f79aa6c/Privatization_Methods_and_Regulations.aspx (last visit 4/4/2014).
(34) See SABIC corporate profile at:
http://www.sabic.com/corporate/en/ourcompany/corporate-profile (last visit 4/4/2014).
(35) Khaled Altaweel, SABIC wa al Taksees [SABIC and Privatization], ALRIYADH, April 23, 2003,
available at http://www.alriyadh.com/21877 (Arabic).
(36) Eljelly, supra note 11.
(37) Id.
(38) See Privatization Objectives and Policies,
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objective by selling part of its shares in some public enterprises to the private
sector through public subscription. While the enterprises slated for
privatization span different sectors, the common feature of their privatization
processes is that all of them have been only partially privatized. The former
owner of the firms, the Saudi government, abandoned only portions of its
stakes in these firms to the private sector; hence, none of these firms has been
fully privatized.(39)
The government either retains its shares directly(40) or manages them
through public funds such as the Public Investment Fund or agencies such as
the Public Pension Agency and General Organization for Social Insurance.(41)
The share of state ownership in privatized enterprises varies from one
enterprise to another. For instance, the Saudi government owns 75.6% of
Saudi Basic Industrial Corp. (SABIC),(42) 83.6% of Saudi Telecom Company,(43)
http://www.sec.gov.sa/getdoc/1a83d98a-87d2-40c1-abb8fddd8c959b26/Privatization_Objectives_and_Policies.aspx (last visit 4/29/2014).
(39) Ibrahim A On our & Bruno S Sergi, Privatization of Public Enterprises in Saudi Arabia: Why
the Process is Slow, WORLD COMMERCE REVIEW, June 2010, at 27, available at
http://www.worldcommercereview.com/feeds/show/WCRVol4Issue2 (last visit 4/4/2014).
(40) For example, the Saudi government owns 74.3% of Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) and
Saudi Aramco (a Saudi Arabian national petroleum and natural gas company) owns 6.9%. See
the SEC profile at Saudi Stock Exchange’s website (Tadawul):
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/lYuxDoIwGAYf6f8oVMIoDLVAGrTQ0C6mgxqC
gDFGX9-6uagxN94dOQrM_j6c_G1YZnmntxqr1CYnUwYRJRFkJXeZh1bM5Rp8PbNQ3NAJrVpi1rEAP66RWP469ZMN2UMyX7c2l9JbZbpQJ
ZcrHMObVk8xDZr9Fl6vqHOo5PtQpd9g!!/dl2/d1/L0lHSkovd0RNQUprQUVnQSEhL1lCWncvZW4!/?s
ymbol=5110&tabOrder=8&chart_type=chart_oneDay&announcmentNumber=&isAnnual= (last
visit 4/11/2014) (Arabic).
(41) These funds and agencies are considered government entities. Their regulations and rules
enacted by the government and their directors appointed also by the Saudi government.
Therefore, when I refer in this study to the government ownership it includes the ownership of
these funds and agencies.
(42) See Tadawul, available at:
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_AewIE8TIwN3Q0tDA0_v4EDLUCNHIwMvc6B8JJK8QbCpgYGniU9YiLOPu7GBgQFJut0DwkxBuoONg
gO8jA08jQjoDk7N0_fzyM9N1S_IDY0od1RUBAD4zNLM/dl2/d1/L3dDb1ZBQSEhL3dHa0FKREFOZ0
EhIS9ZQkpKdzQ1dy83X04wQ1ZSSTQyMEcxOTEwSUtTUTlVMkEyMEI1/?symbol=2010&tabOrder
=8&chart_type=chart_oneDay&announcmentNumber=&isAnnual= (last visit 4/11/2014).
(43) See Tadawul, available at,

44

[Year 33, Issue No. 78 April 2019]

https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2019/iss78/9

]

12

Faraj: ?????? ??????: ????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ??? ????? ??????? ?? ??????? ??????? ????????

[Dr. Meshal Khalil Faraj ]
and 15.7% of Saudi Public Transport Co. (SAPTCO).(44) It is obvious that the
government is not the controlling shareholder in some privatized enterprises,
which enhances the role of the private sector in managing the affairs of those
firms.
Privatization is not the only vehicle the government uses to engage in the
local stock market. The diversification of the world’s largest oil-producing
economy has been the mantra of the Saudi government in the last few
years.(45) The Saudi government invests a portion of its oil surplus into
economic gains through public funds and agencies (except the Public
Investment Fund).(46) Direct investment in the equity market serves this
purpose and provides an alternative economic conduit with high returns. Some
government related companies also invest in the equity market, which
indirectly enables the government to retain leverage over some companies’
decisions.
Government ownership in privatized firms and direct investment in the
equity market reflects the constant role of the Saudi government in the
economy. The Saudi economy has an oil-based economy with solid control
over major economic activities.(47) The state’s strong macroeconomic position
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_AewIE8TIwN3Q0tDA0_v4EDLUCNHIwMvc6B8JJK8QbCpgYGniU9YiLOPu7GBgQFJut0DwkxBuoONg
gO8jA08jQjoDk7N0_fzyM9N1S_IDY0od1RUBAD4zNLM/dl2/d1/L0lDU0NTQ1FvS1VRIS9JSFJBQUl
nb0FNeUtibTZtL1lCSkp3NDU0a3NseXR3ISEvN19OMENWUkk0MjBHMTkxMElLU1E5VTJBMjBCNS
9hY3Rpb25TdHJpbmcvY29tcGFueQ!!/?symbol=7010&tabOrder=8&roleId=&roleTypeVal= (last
visit 4/11/2014).
(44) See Tadawul, available at,
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_AewIE8TIwN3Q0tDA0_v4EDLUCNHIwMvc6B8JJK8QbCpgYGniU9YiLOPu7GBgQFJut0DwkxBuoONg
gO8jA08jQjoDk7N0_fzyM9N1S_IDY0od1RUBAD4zNLM/dl2/d1/L3dDb1ZBQSEhL3dHa0FKREFOZ0
EhIS9ZQkpKdzQ1dy83X04wQ1ZSSTQyMEcxOTEwSUtTUTlVMkEyMEI1/?symbol=4040&tabOrder
=8&chart_type=chart_oneDay&announcmentNumber=&isAnnual= (last visit 4/11/2014).
(45) See Caryle Murphy, Saudi Reaches out to diversify its Economy, THE NATIONAL, Feb. 14, 2010,
http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/saudi-reaches-out-to-diversify-its-economy.
(46) The Public Investment Fund does not buy or sell shares in the market it just manage
government shares in some privatized enterprises.
(47) In 2012 the government “posted a budget surplus of 14.2 percent of GDP” and in 2013
posted a budget surplus of 7.4 percent of GDP. Angus McDowall, Saudi Arabia Starts to Curb
Spending Growth in 2014 Budget, REUTERS, Dec. 23,2013, available at:
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places it in a good position to undertake a key role in the equity market. There
is no evidence that the government is planning to wind up this massive
investment. This can be understood as the government ownership being not
an adventitious intervention in the equity market, but a long-term investment.
B. Performance of State-Owned Firms
Various studies have linked government ownership with inefficiencies and
the waste of resources.(48) In contrast, other studies have found that stateowned enterprises (SOE) are efficient, successful, and in some cases
outperform private peers.(49) In Saudi Arabia, the debate over the
government’s partial ownership of publicly traded companies is still evolving.
Improving the performance of state-owned firms has been an economic
demand. The view has been that the government entities underperform their
private rivals.(50) This view is plausible elsewhere but it may not hold in the
case of Saudi Arabia for two reasons.(51) First, economic development in Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf region has been led by firms wholly or partly government
owned.(52) The best examples of these corporations are the Saudi Arabian Oil
Company (ARAMCO), the world’s largest oil company, and the petrochemical
giant Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Company (SABIC).(53) Second, corporations
fully or partially owned by the Saudi government have been genuine profit-

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/23/saudi-budget-idUSL6N0K220720131223; see also
Angus McDowall & Andrew Torchia, Saudi Arabia Sets Record Budget for 2013, REUTERS, Dec. 29,
2012
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/29/saudi-budgetidUSL5E8NT17K20121229.
(48) For instance, Andrei Shleifer, supra note 5, Bennedsen, supra note 5.
(49) Marten Hvidt, Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends
(Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, Working
Paper, 2013) (citing Steffen Hertog, Lean and Mean: The New Breed of State-Owned Enterprises
in the Gulf Monarchies, in INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE GULF: A SOCIOECONOMIC REVOLUTION 17-29 (JeanFrancois Seznec & Mimi Kirk eds., 2010)); Eljelly, supra note 11, at 25( arguing that government
ownership is not crippled with inefficiency because the government owned firms led economic
development and these firms have been genuine profit-oriented entities).
(50) Id. at 25.
(51) Id.
(52) Id.
(53) Id.
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oriented entities, and compete with their private rivals in various economic
sectors.(54)
Despite a lack of information about firms prior to privatization, these
enterprises do not start from scratch as startup enterprises after privatization.
For a long time, they have operated with preferential treatment from the
government. For instance, the government always instructs its agencies to
procure their needs from companies owned by the government.(55) They enjoy
natural or regulatory monopolies.(56)
State ownership inevitably affects the performance of firms. With no
serious competition or bankruptcies, it is easy to assume that these firms were
not economically feasible. Recently, a study found that two privatized firms
showed a substantial profitability improvement compared to their pre-initial
public offering (IPO) performance.(57) It observed also that the privatized firms
experienced a substantial increase in their return on assets (ROA) and their
return on sales (ROS) post-IPO compared to pre-IPO.(58)
Another study sheds light on the performance of firms partially owned by
the government during the period 2000-2003. It found that governmentrelated firms performed at least as well as privately-owned corporations with
respect to all measures of performance.(59) They had higher and statistically
significant ROA (efficiency), return on equity (ROE), and higher net profit
margin (NPM) (21.47%) than non-government related corporations.(60)

(54) Id.
(55) Yakubu A. Umar & Ali H. Al-Elg, Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in
Saudi
Arabia,
5,
http://faculty.kfupm.edu.sa/coe/sadiq/proceedings/SCAC2004/23.ASC093.EN.Umar&Elg.Corpor
ate%20Ownership%20Structure%20in%20S%20_1_.pdf (last visit 4/7/2014)
(56) Id.
(57) Alanazi, Liu & Forster, supra note 11, at 1, 21. (explaining that the main purpose of the
study is to assess Saudi firms' profitability after they go public via an Initial Public Offering (IPO).
It has examined a sample of 21 privatized and IPO Saudi firms. Privatized firms consists of the
Saudi Telecommunication Company and the National Cooperative for Insurance Company.
Given only two privatized firms in the sample, the result must be treated with caution.)
(58) Id, at 21.
(59) Eljelly, supra note 11, at 30.
(60) Id.
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The available evidence on the performance of firms partly owned by the
government emphasizes the efficiency of government ownership. It is hard to
attribute this performance to one single factor. One view is that the positive
impact on these firms is the possibility of having natural and legalized
monopolistic power.(61) It is true that they used to enjoy monopolistic power
but after privatization, when the market is open for competitors, this view may
no longer hold. Others may argue that these firms do not start as young
corporations but have long experience, which enables them to deal with the
post-privatization stage. Whatever the explanation, the consensus among
observers on the effectiveness of Saudi government ownership has not been
objectively challenged.(62)
III- Government Ownership and Saudi Corporate Governance
A. Shareholder Primacy and Government Ownership Strategy
It is well established that there are two competing board structures among
corporate governance systems around the globe: single-tier and two-tier
(codetermination).(63) The chief difference between these structures is the
presence of employees on the board of directors. In single-tier jurisdictions,
such as the U.S., U.K., and Japan, employees have no representation; one
board exercises the legal power to supervise and manage the corporation.(64)
The two-tier board regime, in jurisdictions such as Germany, requires
employee representation in the board. This codetermination structure splits
the board’s functions between a management board and a supervisory

(61) Umar & Al-Elg, supra note 55, at 5.
(62) Eljelly, supra note 11. Alanazi, Liu & Forster, supra note 11.
(63) Henry Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, the End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J.
439, 440 (2001) (arguing that “[d]espite real differences in the corporate systems, the deeper
tendency is toward convergence, as it has been since the nineteenth century. The basic law of
corporate governance-indeed, most of corporate law- has achieved a high degree of uniformity
across developed market jurisdictions, and continuing convergence toward a single, standard
model is likely”).
(64) REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 56 (2nd ed. 2009).
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board.(65) The management board consists only of executives and manages the
company’s business. The supervisory board, in contrast, represents nonexecutive directors and representatives of the company’s employees, and
supervises the company’s management.(66)
The Act adheres to the tenet that the board of directors should have
exclusive control over the company’s management.(67) Under this regime, the
board exercises the legal power to supervise and manage the company.(68)
Employees and other constituencies are not involved in managing or
supervising the company’s activities.
Only shareholders are entitled to elect directors under the Act.(69)
Restricting directors’ elections to shareholders is another chief feature of the
single tier board structure that the Act adopts. The justification for this
shareholder primacy is that shareholders are a firm’s residual beneficiaries.
The government, as an equity owner, is entitled to exercise voting rights
that are associated with equity. When the government holds a controlling
stake, its leverage over a firm’s affairs is difficult to challenge. Whether it is
possible depends substantially on the government’s strategy in administering
its controlling stake.
The Supreme Economic Council has established various privatization
methods.(70) Methods of privatization involving sale contracts range from
wholesale to the public to sale to a principal investor.(71) The choice of how to
approach the sale is contingent upon the type of the enterprise and the
specified objective.(72) Yet, all sales conducted through public offerings were
not full ownership transfers, as the state partially maintained its shareholdings
in each privatized firm. Thus, mixed ownership is the practical outcome of the
(65) Shivnath Tripathi, Comparative Board Structures under Corporate Governance Framework,
Jan. 9, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2282924 (discussing the two
tier board structure under German law).
(66) Id. (citing the German Stock Corporation Act § 111).
(67) See the Act, supra note 8.
(68) Kraakman et al., supra note 64 .
(69) Faraj, supra note 14, at 25.
(70) See methods of privatization, supra note 33.
(71) Id.
(72) Id.
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state ownership strategy, which does not entirely uproot the interest of the
state.
Although agencies and government funds are affiliates of the Ministry of
Finance, each carries out its own agenda independently. The common
characteristic observed is that these agencies are passive investors.(73) This
means that shares owned by the government are most likely idle; they are not
traded in the market.(74) The majority of the state’s interests are scattered
throughout privatized firms. This serves the goal of being a long-term strategic
investor.
The corporate governance style embraced by the Act provides insight into
potential concerns over state ownership. The governance system in the
Kingdom owes much to the nature of the ownership and control of publicly
traded companies.(75) Observations from the experiences of developing
countries show that mixed ownership does not involve the same political costs
as full privatization.(76) Toward this end, some of the Kingdom’s agencies
explicitly indicate that they are not seeking control.(77)
(73) For instance, in an interview with the Public Pension Agency’s governor Mohammad Al
Kharashi confirming that the Agency is not “under pressure to divest any of [their] stakes,"
Mirna Sleiman, Marwa Rashad and Angus McDowall, Saudi Pension Agency Eyes Property
Investment,
No
Plan
to
Sell
Stocks,
REUTERS,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/06/saudi-pensions-idUSL6N0NS33920140506.
(74) Kamal Naser, Shares Prices To the Release of Financial Statement in Emerging Stock Market:
The Case of Saudi Arabia, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND STOCK VOLATILITY: ISSUES AND
REMEDIES 95 (Nidal Rashid Sabri ed., 2002).
(75) Ibrahim A. Onour, Implementing Privatization Strategy of Saudi Arabia: Issues and
Challenges,
10
(Dec.
15,2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189804.
(76) THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], THE GOVERNANCE OF
MIXED-OWNERSHIP ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA: DISCUSSION PAPER 5, Oct. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/SecondMeetingLatinAmericanSOENetworkMixedOwnership.pdf
(last visit 8/17/2014) (discussing governance issues arising from mixed ownership in Latin
American countries. It found that mixed ownership enables the state to implement a gradual
implementation of reform and reduce both the economic and political risks of a wholesale
divestiture).
(77) Sanabil's Investment Principles states that it aims to “[m]aintain influential/active minority
ownership to ensure ability to add value through board representation but without assuming
control.”
Sananbil’s
Investment
Principles
at
available
at:
http://sanabil.sa/en/whatwedo/Pages/InvestmentPrinciples.aspx (last visit 8/17/2014).
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B. Controlling and Government Ownership
Nearly a decade since the commencement of the privatization program, the
state continuously held its grip on the market. The state holdings, which
include direct and indirect ownership, make the government the largest
institutional stockholder. For instance, the market value of the investments of
the Public Investment Fund alone is 407.6 billion riyals (roughly $108.6 billion),
which constitutes 35% of the total market value of the stock market. (78) By
various measurements, the Public Investment Fund is the largest institutional
investor in the Saudi stock market.(79) On the other hand, the investments of
the General Organization for Social Insurance form 11% of the market value of
the stock market.(80) The investments held by these Funds are just a glimpse of
the extent of the government’s investments.(81)
This size of government intervention in the stock market places the
government in a controlling position in a number of listed companies. This
triggers certain provisions of the Capital Market Law's implementing
regulations.(82) Under Article 13(c)(2)(i) of the Mergers and Acquisition
Regulations, controlling shareholders may offer a permissive offer at any time
but if he elects not to make an offer he will not be allowed, without prior
consent of the Authority, to acquire further shares in the company.(83) The

(78) Sindox Al Estethmarat Ytsader Mullak Souq Al Ashum bi 407 Millar Riyal [The Public
Investment Fund Tops Stock Market’s Shareholders by 407 Billion Riyal], ALEQTISADIAH, available
at http://www.aleqt.com/2014/07/10/article_865848.html (last visit 8/17/2014) (Arabic).
(79) Id.
(80) Id.
(81) Five out of seven largest investors in the market is one of the government affiliates, id.
(82) Capital Market Law and its regulations govern issuance and trading of securities and market
oversight.
(83) Article 13 (a) stipulates that Permissive Offer occurs when:
1) Any person acquires, whether by a transaction or a series of transactions, shares which
(taken together with shares held, acquired or where shareholding control is vested in
persons acting in concert with him) carry 30% or more of the voting rights of a company
listed on the Exchange; or
2) Any person who, together with persons acting in concert with him, holds not more than
30% of the voting rights of a company listed on the Exchange and such person, or any
person acting in concert with him, acquires additional shares which increase his
percentage of the voting rights to more than 30%,
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Listing Rules restrict a controlling shareholder, if he is specified in the
prospectus, from disposing “shares for a period of six months from the date on
which in the shares first commences on the Exchange.”(84)
The Glossary of Defined Terms Used in the Regulations and Rules of the
Capital Market defines “control” as
The ability to influence the actions or decisions of another person through,
whether directly or indirectly, alone or with a relative or affiliate (a) holding
30% or more of the voting rights in a company or (b) having the right to
appoint 30% or more of the members of the governing body; “controller” shall
be construed accordingly.(85)
The inquiry to determine whether a stockholder controls or not is whether
he influences the company’s business decisions. There are two tests through
which it may be determined if a shareholder can influence decision-making.
First, if he owns at least 30% of the voting rights. Second, if he has the right to
appoint at least 30% of the governing body, i.e., the board of directors.
Control has also been defined as “the power to influence people’s
behavior.”(86) The Glossary formulates a bright line standard for control, which
is 30% of ownership or the right to appoint 30% of the board of directors.
Nonetheless, the determination of control in practice is not usually simple. A
shareholder may not meet the threshold of 30% but still influence the
company's business decisions. Given the fact that individual retail investors
3)

Such persons may extend an offer, in accordance with the relevant provisions of these
Regulations, to the holders of any class of equity share capital, whether voting or nonvoting, and also to the holders of any class of voting non-equity share capital of the
offeree company. An offer for different classes of equity share capital must be
comparable; the Authority should be consulted in advance in such cases.
Merger and Acquisition Regulations, Capital Market Authority, available at:
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/Merger%20and%20Acquisition%20Regulations.pdf
(84) Article 49 of the Listing Rule available at:
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/Listing%20rules.pdf.
(85) The Glossary issued by the Capital Market Authority, available at:
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/Glossary.pdf ("The Glossary").
(86) OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 190 (10th ed. 2005). In Arabic, it has been defined as “influence”
or
“govern”,
see
almaany
dictionary
at:
http://www.almaany.com/home.php?language=arabic&lang_name=%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8
%D9%8A&word=%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%A9 (last visit 10/4/14).
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dominate the market,(87) a shareholder who owns a relatively small percentage
of a company's shares, such as 10%, can exercise control over the company.
That is, shares are scattered among retail shareholders; although they form
the largest block of investors, they are deemed the minority in general
meetings. Hence, they are passive investors and no challenges are expected
from them.
Such a scenario brings to light the incompleteness of this definition of
control. Although it is a substantial concept in the corporate literature, no
cases centrally involving control have arisen either under the Glossary or the
Act. Lawmakers cannot predict during the drafting process all possible
instances that a law will have to cover. Formulating a concept in an openended fashion is a way to encourage judicial discretion to fill gaps, but in Saudi
Arabia, judicial authorities do not retain residual lawmaking power.(88)
Judicial intervention has not been conspicuous in Saudi jurisprudence. Saudi
judges adhere to the literal readings of rules, and simply apply laws as they
appear on the books.(89) They are not trained to exercise judicial discretion
outside of the Shariah law context.(90) The Act and other codified regulations,
by nature, are not a progeny of Shariah law.
In the corporate world, a controlling shareholder owes a substantial duty to
other shareholders. That is, he is in a position enabling him to control another
person's property. Hence, the force of legal logic dictates that exceptional
influence demands exceptional discipline. Inconsistent with this line of
thought, a controlling shareholder under the Act is not restricted from
expropriating company assets, and no fiduciary duties are imposed on him. (91)
(87) Studies indicate that retail investors own roughly 94 percent of stock market shares. See
Eljelly, supra note 11, at 28; RAMADY, supra note 23, at 167.
(88) The judicial function in the Kingdom is carried out by three different bodies: Shariah Courts,
the Board of Grievances, and quasi-judicial committees. See Faraj, supra note 14, at 28.
(89) Id. at 28.
(90) Shariah law in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is not a codified body of law and Shariah judges
in deciding cases refer to the backlogs of Islamic jurisprudence. Id. at 155-156.
(91) Directors' duties under the Act are scattered across several provisions but it generally
assemble the essence of traditional duty of care and duty of loyalty. For example, Article 71 of
the Act states that: " A director may not have any interest whether directly or indirectly, in
transactions or contracts made for the account of the company, except with authorization from
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Such duties traditionally function to protect the expectations of shareholders
of gaining returns on their investments.(92)
An inherent concern over controlling shareholders has traditionally been
the expropriation of corporate assets. Government control over companies
triggers a different concern. If there is government ownership, employing firm
assets for the public interest is automatically justified. Given the fact that the
Saudi market is highly concentrated, the consequence of the lack of fiduciary
duties imposed on controlling stockholders is an erosion of shareholders'
expectations of gaining returns.
The conventional approach to state ownership emphasizes the political
forces driving deviation from wealth maximization.(93) This emphasis has a solid
basis since state ownership is directly influenced by the political process. (94) It
is hard to refute this argument since when the state itself invests directly in the
market, the political process is inevitably influential.
Nevertheless, in the Saudi case, the state invests through various funds and
agencies with no explicit agenda other than improving the performance of
these firms. No litigation has arisen in the Kingdom targeting the government
either as a controller or as a shareholder in general. The performance of
government-related companies is better than their private counterparts.(95)
the Ordinary General Assembly, to be renewed annually….". Article 78 addresses duty of care
violations stipulating, “Directors shall be jointly responsible for damages to the company, or the
stockholders, or third parties, arising from their maladministration of the affairs of the
company, or their violation of the provision of these Regulations or of the company's bylaws.
Any stipulation contrary to this provision shall be considered nonexistent.”
(92) Seher Khawaja, Corporate Free Market Responsibility: Addressing Rights Violations with a
Fiduciary Duty Approach to Natural Resources Extractions in Weak Governance Zone, 3 BROOK. J.
FIN. & COM. L. 185, 199 (2008).
(93) See K. A. D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors, 30 J. CORP. L. 219, 233-34 (2005);
Pargendler, supra note 6, at 2919 (explaining that the 2008 bailout raises legal concerns and
U.S. legal scholars warned that the law does not sufficiently protect minority shareholders)
(citing Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 89
TEX. L. REV. 1293 (2011); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory
and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 287, 326-44 (2010)).
(94) See Camara, id, at 234 (stating that “[a] distribution of views about the good like in the
United States or the United Kingdom results under most sets of political processes (certainly
democratic ones) in outcomes that deviate from shareholder wealth maximization”).
(95) See Eljelly, supra note 11, at 30.
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This may explain why state intervention in the Saudi stock market has not
triggered the traditional concerns over such intervention, which hints at the
profit-oriented approach that the government adopted in operating these
firms.
The foregoing analysis reveals the regulatory vacuum that undermines the
structure of accountability. A controlling shareholder, whether the state or a
private entity, can exercise his role with no legal constraints. Put differently, he
is in a position to influence business decisions without having to consider the
interest of the company. The lack of a standard of conduct makes the role of a
controlling shareholder more complex.(96) Minority shareholders will not be
able to hold the controlling shareholder accountable if he violates an ex ante
rule or standard. The minorities will be overburdened if they challenge the
government's actions. The actions of the shareholding government can be
expected to prevail since its actions are supposedly justified by the public
interest. Government ownership substantially transforms the accountability
system since there is no set of duties to effectively restrain the state as a
controlling shareholder.
C. Islamic Law and Controlling Shareholders
The lack of regulatory rules and judicial interpretation complicates the
duties of controlling shareholders. That implies the likely application of Islamic
law(97) to fill the regulatory vacuum. This part gives an insight into the rationale
behind enforcing Shariah principles to the actions of a controlling shareholder.
Shariah is the national law of Saudi Arabia. The first article of the Basic Law
of Governance of Saudi Arabia states “[t]he Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a
sovereign Arab Islamic state. Its religion is Islam. Its constitution is Almighty
God's Book, The Holy Qur'an, and the Sunna (Tradition) of the Prophet (Peace
Be Upon Him).” Article 17 of the Basic Law provides that “[o]wnership, capital
and labor are basic components of the economic and social entity of the

(96) A standard of conduct has been defined as “how an actor should conduct a given activity or
play a given role.” See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, the Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437 (1993).
(97) Shariah can be spelled Sharia or Shariah.
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Kingdom. They are personal rights which perform a social function in
accordance with the Islamic Sharia.”(98)
Shariah is the main source of the Saudi legal system, which has two
significant implications for policymakers and judges. First, all proposed laws
and statutes must comply with Shariah principles. Second, Shariah is the prime
reference for all laws and regulations, so whenever a regulatory vacuum is
found, the principles of Islamic law are to fill the gap.
For corporations, the practical question is how to apply religious principles
to a commercial entity operating in a secular context.(99) The question becomes
more difficult when it is considered that nowhere does Shariah definitively
tackle or define corporations or the legal structure of a corporation. (100) Yet,
the argument that corporations are not subject to Islamic legal principles
would be misleading.(101) For instance, a company should structure its accounts
receivable books in compliance with the Shariah prohibition on riba
(interest),(102) and principal-agent relationships are subject to the Islamic
agency rules (Al-Wakalah).(103) Indeed, many aspects of corporate activities are
highly exposed to Islamic legal principles.
While a "pure" nexus of contracts theory is not a wholly tenable process to
approach Western corporate questions,it is the most effective mechanism to
evaluate the conduct, including fiduciary duties, of corporate actors under
Islamic law.(104) Saudi lawmakers settled the issue by defining a corporation as
a "contract under which two or more persons undertake to participate in an
enterprise for profit, with each contributing a share in the form of money or
services..."(105) A direct implication of this approach is that judges will apply the
principles of Shariah contracts to the activities of a publicly traded corporation.
(98) Saudi Arabia Basic Law of Governance, No: A/90, Dated 24/8/1412 H (March 1992).
(99) Craig C. Briess, Esq., The Crescent and the Corporation: Analysis and Resolution of
Conflicting Positions between the Western Corporation and the Islamic Legal System, 8 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 453, 478 (2009).
(100) IMRAN AHSAN KHAN NYAZEE, OUTLINES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 278 (2003).
(101) Briess, supra note 99, at 455.
(102) Id.
(103) See Nyazee, supra note 100, at 228-278.
(104) Id.
(105) Article 2 of the Act, supra note 8.
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This raises the question of whether a contract is the proper template to define
the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder relationship. At first glance,
there is no tangible evidence of a direct relationship between a minority and a
controlling shareholder. The nexus-contract theory of a firm is premised on the
notion that a firm is a legal fiction resulting from the complex set of
contractual relationships among employees, creditors, shareholders, and
management.(106) Stockholders accept the contract by buying shares in the
corporation and indirectly pricing the quality of the firm's governance
commitments.(107) The theory assumes that all stockholders are parties to the
contractual relationships within the company. Applying this theory within the
Saudi jurisdiction requires consideration of Shariah contract principles.
In principle, for there to be a contract under Shariah law, it requires that
there be duties placed on both parties, and that a breach is to be assessed
upon their performances. The content of a duty generally involves the promise
of a party. A breach of the promise triggers a cause of action for damages.
Assuming that controlling and minority shareholders are contracting parties
would elicit the question of what is the content of duties of this agreement.
The determination of the duties of each party is a fundamental objective as
breach entirely depends on it. It is hard to say that shareholders have
contractual duties since there is no written agreement between the assumed
parties. Consequently, to argue that the principles of Islamic contracts can
contain this relationship is to stand on shaky footing.
Aside from the nexus-contract theory debate, one may argue that the
general principles of Shariah impose a standard of conduct on partners.
Shariah mandates that partners act with care and not cause harm to the
company or other partners.(108) Trust frames the relationships among

(106) Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: Conservative Contractarian Critique of
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 859 (1997).
(107) Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J.
CORP. L. 779, 783 (2006).
(108) See Masoliat al shreek and Al modareb (Al bank wa Mjlis Al Edrah) un Al kasarah [The
Responsibility of Partners and Speculator (Bank and Board of Directors) for the Losses, available
at http://www.qaradaghi.com/chapterDetails.aspx?ID=434 (last visit 7/23/2015) (Arabic).
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partners.(109) This standard applies to all shareholders, hence it does not place
any additional duty to the controlling shareholders.
IV- The Structure of the Judicial System in Saudi Arabia and the
Government as a Shareholder
As stated elsewhere, there is no single case addressing the duties of
controlling shareholders under Saudi law. This leaves courts with no guidance
for litigation in the future. Consequently, it remains unclear even in what
forum a plaintiff should sue a controlling shareholder, particularly if that
shareholder is the government. This section will attempt to identify the forum
such cases would land on, after introducing the structure of the Saudi judicial
system and courts jurisdictions.
The judicial function is carried out in Saudi Arabia by three entities: Shariah
Courts, the Board of Grievances (Diwan Almadhalim) (Administrative Court),
and quasi-judicial committees. Each has jurisdiction over cases according to its
own regulations, and each has its own hierarchy. Notably, the Saudi judicial
system does not have a system for reporting court decisions.(110) There is no
concept of judicial precedent in Saudi Arabia, so the decisions of a court or a
judicial committee have no binding authority with respect to subsequent
cases.(111) This section will outline the jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts
under the Shariah Courts system and the Board of Grievances in an attempt to
determine where a case against the state as a controlling shareholder would
be litigated. The discussion will not extend to the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial
committees, since such cases would not fall within their jurisdiction.

(109) Id.
(110) Fahad Mohammed Almajid, A Conceptual Framework for Reforming the Corporate
Governance of Saudi Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative and Analytical Study from a Legal
Perspective, 162 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manchester) (available at
the British Library at: http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.511264 (citing David J.
Karl, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What Foreign Attorneys Should Know, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L.
& ECON. 131, 149 (1992)).
(111) Overview of Saudi Arabia Domestic and Foreign Corporate Laws, available at
http://www.aljadaan.com/files/file/Overview_of_the_Saudi_Arabian_Legal_System.pdf
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A. Shariah Courts System
The Law of the Judiciary of 1975 was once the primary reference for the
Shariah courts system.(112) It organized the Shariah courts into the following
hierarchy: The Supreme Judicial Council at the top, then the Courts of Appeals
(Cassation), and the Courts of First Instance (General Courts and Summary
Courts).(113)
In 2007, the Saudi government enacted the long anticipated Law of the
Judiciary, which replaced the Law of the Judiciary of 1975.(114)The Law of the
Judiciary of 2007 organized the courts into the following hierarchy: the
Supreme Court at the top, then the Courts of Appeals, and then the First
Instance Courts which are the General Courts, the Penal Courts, the Family
Courts, the Commercial Courts, and the Labor Courts.(115) The jurisdictions of
these courts are set according to the Law of the Judiciary of 2007, the Law of
Procedure before Shariah Courts, and the Law of Criminal Procedure.(116)
Article 5 of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007 established a Supreme Judicial
Council, which sits at the top of the Shariah judicial hierarchy system.(117) The
role of the Council is limited to exercising an administrative function.(118) That
role involves supervising the work of the courts, including the administration of
employment-related affairs of all members of the judiciary, such as the
appointment of judges.(119)
The Law of the Judiciary of 2007 also introduced the Supreme Court for the
first time. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is determined by the Law of

(112) The Law of the Judiciary, Royal Decree No. (M/64) dated 14/07/1395 (1975) (“the Law of
the Judiciary's 1975” hereafter).
(113) Articles 5-25 of the Law of the Judiciary of 1975, id.
(114)Article 85 of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007, supra note 7.
(115) AL JARBOU, supra note 4, at 132.
(116) The Law of Procedure before the Shariah Courts, Royal Decree No. (M/1) dated
22/01/1435 (2013); the Law of Criminal Procedure, Royal Decree No. (M/2) dated 22/1/1435
(2013). See also AL JARBOU, id.
(117) AL JARBOU, id. at 133.
(118) See Article 6 of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007 to review the functions of the Supreme
Council under the new Law of the Judiciary, supra note 7
(119) Id.
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Procedure before Shariah Courts and the Law of Criminal Procedure.(120) The
key task of the Supreme Court is to observe the implementation of Shariah and
other laws and review the judgments of the Courts of Appeals. The Courts of
Appeals, in contrast, decide appealable cases from the First Instance Courts.
A litigant must file suit in the First Instance Courts. Each court has
jurisdiction over matters according to the Law of Procedure before Shariah
Courts, and the Law of Criminal Procedure.(121)
B. Commercial Courts
The Law of the Judiciary of 2007 established the Commercial Courts, hence
the Commercial Courts are considered part of the Shariah courts system. They
have jurisdiction over most commercial disputes. Before the Law of the
Judiciary of 2007, the Board of Grievances was authorized to adjudicate most
commercial disputes.(122) Royal Decree number M/63 on 26/11/1407 AH (1987)
granted the Board this authority.(123) The authority of the Board over
commercial disputes lasted until the Council of Ministers resolution number
167 on 14/9/1401 AH (1989), which prescribed the establishment of
specialized commercial, labor, and traffic courts.(124)
The Commercial Courts are in the establishment phase. Currently, the Board
of Grievances decides most commercial disputes, including disputes under the
Act. Nevertheless, it is still worth examining whether the Commercial Courts
can adjudicate disputes involving the state as a controlling shareholder.
Article 35 of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007 stipulates that:
Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over the following:
A. All commercial disputes, whether principal or consequential, occurring
among traders;
(120) Article 11 of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007, supra note 7.
(121) Article 25 of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007, supra note 7.
(122) AL JARBOU, supra note 4, at 170.
(123) Id.
(124) Commercial litigation has gone through various major developments between the
establishment of the Commercial Court and the authorization of the Board of Grievances to
adjudicate the commercial lawsuits. For more information about these developments, see AL
JARBOU, id.
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B. Lawsuits filed against the trader because of principal or consequential
acts thereof;
C. Disputes occurring among partners in partnerships;
D. All suits and violations relating to commercial laws without prejudice to
the jurisdiction of the Grievances Board;
E. Bankruptcy lawsuits, interdiction of bankrupt, or lifting thereof;
F. Other commercial disputes.(125)
Provision (c) of Article 35 of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007 is an excellent
candidate on which a plaintiff might rely in bringing a lawsuit. It covers
“[d]isputes occurring among partners in partnerships.” It is formulated in
broad language, which helps judges to accept lawsuits involving partners.
Without wading into the details, it is sufficient to know that the definition of
partnership under the Act is any "contract under which two or more persons
undertake to participate in an enterprise for profit, with each contributing a
share in the form of money or services..."(126)
An interesting question is what would happen if the Public Investment Fund
(the Fund) or another government agency were named as a defendant. Article
35 (c) sets out the jurisdiction of Commercial Courts over disputes occurring
between partners of a company, and shareholders by definition are partners
under Saudi law. The Fund as a shareholder, whether controlling or not,
therefore is a partner. Accordingly, a shareholder plaintiff can sue the Fund.
The Commercial Courts would not have reason to refuse the case. One may
argue that the Board of Grievances as an administrative court should
adjudicate such a case. The thrust of this argument would be that the Board
has jurisdiction over all disputes that involve the government or its
agencies.(127) To enhance the argument, it would be pointed out that the Fund
was established by royal Decree No. M/24 on 25/6/1391 AH (1997), making it a
public agency.(128)
(125) Article 35 of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007, supra note 7.
(126) Article 2 of the Act, supra note 8.
(127) AL JARBOU, supra note 4, at 175.
(128) Id. at 180. (Citing the Board of Grievances decision number 424/T/3, 1410 A.H. (1990)
which declared that “the establishment of independent Administrative Agencies has been
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This argument requires examination of the jurisdiction of the Board of
Grievances. This discussion is the subject of the next section.
C. The Board of Grievances
The Board of Grievances is an independent administrative court affiliated
with the King.(129) The Board of Grievances’ 2007 Law changed the jurisdiction
of the Board so that it now may adjudicate only administrative disputes. Under
the old law, the Board of Grievances’ 1982 Law, the Board was authorized to
adjudicate non-administrative disputes including commercial and criminal
cases.(130) Currently, the only exception to the fact that the Board functions as
an administrative court is that it adjudicates requests for the execution of
foreign judgments and arbitral decisions.(131)
Under the Board of Grievances’ 1982 Law, the Board's judicial hierarchy was
conducted by a number of specialized circuits that had specific jurisdiction
determined geographically and by subject matter.(132) In the lower stage of this
hierarchy, there were a number of first-instance administrative, criminal,
disciplinary, commercial, and subsidiary circuits that represented the diverse
jurisdiction of the Board.(133) At the top of the Board structure, there were a
number of scrutinizing administrative, criminal, and commercial circuits that
also represented the diverse jurisdiction of the Board and functioned as
appellate and supreme courts.(134) Under the Board of Grievances’ 1982 Law,
there was no single supreme administrative court.(135)

carried out in Saudi Arabia by Royal decrees…”). Accordingly, establishment of a public agency
depends on whether was established as a result of a Royal Decree. The decision sets a bright
rule in defining what constitutes a public agency and excludes other factors such funding and
control in determining the status of an entity.
(129) Article 1 of the Board of Grievances, enacted by the Royal Decree (M/78) dated
19/9/1428 H (2007) ("the Board of Grievances’ 2007" hereafter). This law superseded the Law
of the Board of Grievances, which was enacted by the Royal Decree No. M/51 dated 17/7/1402
(1982).
(130) AL JARBOU, supra note 4, at 146.
(131) Id.
(132) Id.
(133) Id.
(134) Id.
(135) Id.
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The Board's 2007 Law restructured the court's hierarchy. Article 8 of the
Law of the Board states that:
Courts of the Board of Grievances consist of the following:
1.

The High Administrative Court.

2.

The Administrative Courts of Appeal.

3.

The Administrative Courts.(136)

In principle, the Board of Grievances has the authority to adjudicate all
disputes as long as they come under Article 13 of the Law of the Board of
Grievances.(137) It states that "the Board of Grievances has jurisdiction to
adjudicate the following:
(a) Cases relating to rights provided for in civil service, military service and
retirement laws for employees of the Government and entities with
independent corporate personality or their heirs and their other
beneficiaries.
(b) Cases for the revocation of final administrative decisions issued by
persons concerned when the appeal is based on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, defect in form or cause, violation of laws and regulations,
error in application or interpretation thereof, abuse of power, including
disciplinary decisions and decisions issued by quasi-judicial committees
and disciplinary boards as well as decisions issued by public benefit
associations-and the like-relating to their activities. The administrative
authority’s refusal or denial to make a decision required to be made by
it in accordance with the laws and regulations shall be deemed an
administrative decision.
(c) Tort cases initiated by the persons concerned against the administrative
authority’s decisions or actions.
(d) Cases related to contracts to which the administrative authority is
party.
(e) Disciplinary cases filed by the competent authority.
(136) The Board of Grievances' 2007, supra note 129.
(137) The Board of Grievances’ 2007, id.
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(f) Other administrative disputes.
(g) Request for execution of foreign judgments and arbitral awards.”(138)
The language of this article suggests that a claim against the Fund arising
out of an act committed by it as a shareholder would not come before the
Board of Grievances. The potential provisions that would govern such a claim
are (b) and (d). Provision (b) concerns claims against administrative decisions.
Provision (d) deals with disputes stemming from contracts to which a public
agency is a party. The activities of a shareholder of a publicly traded
corporation most likely would take the form of voting, if he or she is not a
member of the board of directors. Shareholder voting rights have been defined
as "the voting rights attributable to the shares of a company which are
exercisable at a general meeting."(139) Voting is the mechanism through which
a shareholder can express his or her view about a presented issue at a general
meeting. A shareholder exercising that right is not in a position to decide or
contract with anyone. Voting, as an activity, is not deemed an administrative
decision or a contract. Therefore, the Fund at the general meeting simply acts
in a business-like capacity.
Another argument deals with the administrative dispute criterion. The idea
is that the Board of Grievances has exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes
involving a public authority.(140) The Board adjudicates all administrative
lawsuits against a public authority even when that authority chooses to act, or
is required to act, in a business-like capacity.(141) This administrative dispute
criterion dominates so long as the dispute in question is not governed by
another explicit legal provision.(142) The Scrutinizing Circuit, in disapproving the
Lower Circuit reasoning that all the Board has jurisdiction over all
administrative disputes wherein the government is a party, stated that “many
legal theorists consider having the administration as a party in a certain
dispute is not a sufficient condition to render it an administrative dispute, yet

(138) The Board of Grievances' 2007, id.
(139) The Glossary, supra note 85.
(140) ALJARBOU, supra note 4, at 178-179 (citing the First Commercial Circuit decision number
47, 1415 A.H. (1995)).
(141) Id.
(142) Id. at 180.
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it has to be administrative in its substance and goals.”(143) In our assumed case,
the Fund was established by a Royal Decree and that qualifies it as a public
agency.(144) If it was sued as shareholder, the Commercial Courts would
adjudicate the case. That is, the administrative dispute criterion functions to
place cases under the Board's jurisdiction if they do not fall within another
court's jurisdiction. Article 35(c) of the Law of the Judiciary of 2007 entitles the
Commercial Courts to adjudicate cases occurring among partners of a
corporation.(145) Hence, the Board is not the appropriate jurisdiction to hear
the case, because if the Fund were sued as a shareholder the suit would be
commercial in substance and its goals not administrative.(146)
V- Policy Implications:
The previous sections sketched the inevitable implications of government
ownership on existing corporate governance system. These implications, by
nature, have different characterizations, hence addressing them entails
different policy considerations. First, the presence of the government in the
stock market complicates the lack of controlling shareholder liability. Although
controlling shareholder status is a central concept in the corporate law
literature, the Act does not contain a comprehensive structure of liability to
cover the acts of controlling shareholders. This regulatory vacuum immunizes
the government from liability when it is in a controlling position. This part
attempts to bring attention of lawmakers to this legal defect.
Second, government ownership imposes a fundamental challenge to the
Act. The underlying ideology of the Act, which prioritizes the interest of
shareholders, places constraints on acts that are not aligned with the interest
of these shareholders. The actions of the government are inherently examined
only in the light of the public interest. Since the Act is mainly designed to
address private actions, it is arguably incapable of properly regulating
government actions. The practical approach of this article necessitates an
examination of two competing proposals: the first proposal tends to eliminate
(143) See AL JARBOU, id, at 180 (citing the Board of Grievances decision number 151/T/3, 1409
(1989)). The Board of Grievance has confirmed this approach in different cases.
(144) Id.
(145) The Law of the Judiciary of 2007, supra note 7.
(146) The Board of Grievances decision number 151/T/3, 1409 (1989), supra note 143.
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the government's presence since it is an exceptional intervention. The second
proposal calls for coexistence with the status quo and treating the government
on an equal footing with private actors. This part discusses these proposals and
considers which one is most suitable for the Saudi context.
A. Controlling Shareholder Should be Subject to Liability
While corporate laws hold directors to a set of standards meant to deter
them from exploiting corporate assets for their own interests, they differ in
their approaches: some jurisdictions enforce stringent standards of liability and
some apply lenient standards. The level of standard is a matter of domestic
regulatory policy. Whatever the level of standard, principles of fairness dictate
that controlling shareholders should realize that the consequence of their
actions may affect minority shareholders.
Saudi Arabia formulates a bright-line standard to define control.(147)
Government ownership in most firms falls within the definition of control.
Controlling shareholders have the right to appoint the majority of the directors
and exercise a genuine role in the most substantial affairs of the corporation.
That ability to influence the corporation undermines potential challenges from
minority shareholders, which ultimately affects the governance of the
corporation.
The imposition of obligations on controlling shareholders has been
premised on the theory that they control the corporate enterprise and exercise
control over other shareholders’ property.(148) If an effective accountability
structure does not exist, their conduct will likely be detrimental to minority
shareholders since no court challenge could be expected from them.
Little analysis is needed to detect flaws in the Saudi legal system’s attempt
to set up such an accountability structure. The Glossary sets out a definition of
“control,” as explained earlier, but neither the Act nor the CMA’s regulations
institute a system of accountability that contains standards for the behaviour

(147) See the Glossary, supra note 85.
(148) Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
175, 201 (citing Zahn v. Transamerica Corp, 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1918); HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 240,
654 (3d ed. 1983).
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of controlling shareholders or standards by which those acts will be
reviewed.(149)
This failure of Saudi Arabian law raises agency costs and negatively affects
the corporate governance system. Saudi lawmakers must address this
regulatory vacuum. This flaw was not wrought by the partial privatization
process; it is an inherent defect in the corporate governance system. Thus,
corporate law on the duties of controlling shareholders should not distinguish
between state and private actors. From a lawmaking policy prospective, the
duties of controlling shareholders should emerge in detailed provisions
because Saudi judges are most likely to be reluctant to exercise judicial
discretion otherwise.(150)
B. Complete Privatization Approach
According to the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance, state
shareholders "should carefully evaluate and disclose objectives that justify
state ownership subject these to recurrent review."(151) As explained earlier,
developing capital markets and creating new mechanisms for mobilizing capital
are objectives of privatization.(152) Moreover, the Saudi government has a longterm plan to lower its dependence on oil income, which has led it to adopt an
aggressive strategy of diversification.(153) However, only partial privatization
has been carried out, so the government is frequently a controlling
shareholder and may have obligations to minority shareholders.
The academic attitude toward government shareholding has been skeptical
for some time.(154) Government ownership has been linked to inefficiencies

(149) The Glossary, supra note 85.
(150) See Faraj, supra note 14.
(151) OECD, GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 19 (2015), available
at:
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceofstateownedenterprises/34803211.pdf.
(152) Privatization Objectives and Policies, supra note 38.
(153) Dania Saadi, Saudi Market Opens Up but Gradually, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 22, 2012.
(154) Different studies back private ownership over government ownership, see Pargendler,
supra note 6, at 2958 (citing Rafael La Porta et al., Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN.
265, 290 (2002); William L. Megginson & Jeffry M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of
Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 380 (2001); M. Shirley & Patrick Walsh,
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and the waste of resources.(155) Furthermore, a government is a unique type of
shareholder: it has regulatory power and may have different objectives than
wealth maximization. However, the decision to privatize government services
and transfer them to the private sector is an implied acknowledgment that the
operation contract method and the use of direct government services have
failed.(156)
The implications of state ownership strengthen the call to complete the
privatization of mixed ownership firms.(157) This is a simple solution to describe
the shareholder-regulator conflict as another evil of the state ownership of
firms.(158) Offering the remaining government shareholdings to the public
would certainly eliminate the state's shareholder role.(159) This would maintain
the unifying objective of shareholders toward wealth maximization.
The large scale of the Saudi government’s involvement in the equity market
undermines the privatization scheme. This is not limited to Saudi Arabia. The
experiences of different countries show that those that undertook massive
privatization programs often retained significant shareholdings in major
publicly traded companies.(160) Mixed ownership firms are not spread across
the economy; they concentrate in public utilities, telecommunications,
banking, and hydrocarbons(161) and this well describes the map of the Saudi
government’s investments. Conversely, few governments have ownership
stakes in enterprises that operate in competitive, industrial sectors (e.g.,

Public Versus Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate (World Bank Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 2420, 2001), available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261854). See also Shleifer, supra note 5,
and Bennedsen, supra note 5.
(155) Id.
(156) RAMADY, supra note 23, at 324.
(157) Pargendler, supra note 6, at 2957-58 (introducing wholesale privatization as a strategy to
mitigate the state's conflict of interest as shareholder and corporate governance regulator.)
(158) Id.
(159) Id.
(160) Id.
(161) OECD, SOES OPERATING ABROAD: AN APPLICATION OF THE OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES TO THE CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS OF SOES 3 (2009),
available at:
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/44215438.pdf.
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manufacturing, construction) or the retail or service industries (e.g., shopping,
hospitality).(162)
The reliance on oil as the main conduit of revenue constructs the whole
economy around the role of the government. State revenue is highly exposed
to the volatile oil market. Investing oil surpluses in the stock market is
considered not only an alternative source of revenue but also a buffer against
the volatility of the oil market. This directs the state as a shareholder toward
wealth maximization. Consequently, the interest of the state aligns with
private shareholders’ interests irrespective of whether the state holds a
controlling position or not. The performance of mixed ownership firms, as
shown elsewhere, shows wealth maximization as a goal target of state
shareholders. The absence of litigation against the state as a shareholder
reinforces this conclusion.
C. Status Quo Approach (Mixed Ownership)
The previous section’s analysis challenges the wisdom of complete
privatization in the Saudi context. Maintaining the status quo is still an option.
The partial privatization process turned the state into a shareholder. This
government intervention in the marketplace gives rise to a host of regulatory
concerns.
The Act, which is the primary statute governing public corporations, is
designed to govern private activities. Consequently, it is ill-equipped to address
the actions of government-related funds and agencies. Public laws address
government agencies’ actions only when they act in their capacity as a public
authority.(163) A government is subject to private laws only if it acts without
exercising its capacity as a public authority. Drawing this line justifies
empowering the government with certain legal means that enable it to
conduct public services.(164)
As this article shows, the agency as a shareholder functions in a business
rather than an administrative capacity. Therefore, a lawsuit against a state

(162) Id.
(163) AL JARBOU, supra note 4, at 165.
(164) Id.
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agency would fall under the jurisdiction of the Commercial Courts. For the
same reason, the Act would apply to state agencies and funds.
There are doubts over whether the Act is sufficiently developed to deal with
the state as a shareholder. The corporate law literature generally assumes that
maximization of shareholder wealth is corporate law's goal.(165) It has been
contended that market, political, and social incentive-creating forces form
values that institutional investors consider besides shareholder wealth
maximization.(166) Determining to what extent these forces dictate an
institutional investor's appreciation entails looking into their structures. To
illustrate, the public pension fund structure provides more insulation from
political forces compared to direct state ownership.(167)
The loyalty of directors is traditionally a thorny issue in corporate law and is
complicated by state ownership. When the state is in a controlling position, it
is entitled to appoint a majority of the board of directors. Appointing officials
to the boardroom exposes them to different standards of liability.(168) The Act
explicitly relies on the independence of directors.(169) It adopts the ideology of
shareholder supremacy. Thus, officials placed on a board of directors would
have difficulty to act for the public interest other than shareholder's wealth
maximization, which could generate litigation.
However, an overemphasis on the differences between public and private
control of enterprises would largely overlook their similarities.(170) It is
axiomatic that the interest of shareholders is usually served by wealth
maximization. It is assumed that the state has a different interest.(171) As stated
(165) Camara, supra note 93, at 222-223 (stating that “if shareholder initiative would allow
institutional investors to use shareholder voting effectively, and if institutional investors would
use shareholder voting to increase shareholder wealth, then, insofar as increasing shareholder
wealth is corporate law's goal, shareholder initiative is desirable”).
(166) Id.
(167) Id. at 235.
(168) Most recently, Mr. Sulaiman Al Gwaiz, the Governor of the General Organization for Social
Insurance, appointed as the Chairman of the Banque Saudi Fransi, MAAAL, April 17, 2014
available at: http://www.maaal.com/archives/7409 (Arabic).
(169) Articles 71, 72 and 73 of the Act address different aspects of the loyalty of directors, the
Act, supra note 8.
(170) Pargendler, supra note 6, at 2923.
(171) Id.
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above, research suggests that partially privatized firms outperform their
private counterparts.(172) This implies that government related-directors have
not overturned the goal of wealth maximization.
There has been a proposal to adopt separate corporate laws, one applicable
to state shareholders and another applicable to private shareholders.(173) The
thrust of the proposal is that government-related companies should be
governed by a different set of rules than those governing private sector
companies.(174) The rationale is that government-related companies and
private firms “have different functional characteristic and objectives and would
therefore be best served by different legal regimes.”(175) This proposal stands
in contrast with existing best practices recommendations for state-related
companies.(176) For instance, the OECD, in its Guidelines on Corporate
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, states that “[w]hen streamlining the
legal form of SOEs, government should base themselves as much as possible
on corporate law and avoid creating a specific legal form when this is not
absolutely necessary for the objectives of the enterprise.”(177) In the Saudi
context, this proposal is attainable if agencies and funds, which manage state
investments, exercise regulatory tasks but remain functionally independent.

(172) See Eljelly, supra note 11, at 25.
(173) For full discussion of the dual regulatory regimes see Pargendler, supra note 6, at 2962.
(174) Id. (citing JEAN-DENIS BREDIN, L'ENTERPRISE SEMI-PUBLIQUE ET PUBLIQUE DROIT PRIVE 279 (1957)
(France); see also Jose Cretella Junior, Sociedade de Economia Mista no Brasil, 80 REVISTA DE
DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 33, 37 (1965) (Brazil)).
(175) Id. (explaining Gilson, Hansmann, and [Pargendler] "term this rationale for a dual
regulatory regime "regulatory diversification," which we define as occurring when "[i]he actors
being regulated are not homogeneous in their needs for regulation ," so that efficiency requires
"two or more parallel regimes of regulation with each regime designed to deal with the
particular characteristics of a distinct set of actors." Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann &
Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil,
the United States and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 480 (2011).
(176) Id. at 2964.
(177) Id. (citing OECD Guidelines, supra note 151).
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Conclusion
The difference between state and private ownership is one of differing
objectives: the state serves the public interest and private actors serve their
own interests. They match when the interest of the public leans toward wealth
maximization.
This article cites different studies showing that government-related
companies outperform their private peers, which refutes the fear that state
ownership is linked to inefficiency, at least in the Saudi case.
Despite the efforts of the Saudi government to maintain wealth
maximization, its intervention in the equity market imposes substantial
challenges. Substantial, because the Act is designed to apply to private
activities. Government agencies and public funds, who supervise the
government’s investments in the market, are public entities by definition. I
argue that the Act is the only applicable law to govern publicly traded
companies and thus its rules apply equally to all shareholders.
Although the Act embraces the ideology of shareholder supremacy, it
unexpectedly disregards the duties of controlling shareholders. Neither does
the Glossary develop a comprehensive accountability structure for controlling
shareholders. Shariah law, as the general law in the Kingdom, developed
partnerships principles, but it, too, does not cover controlling shareholder
duties. As it is a central concept in corporate law, this paper urges the
imposition of duties on controlling shareholders. They should be formulated in
detailed provisions since Saudi judges do not exercise a residual lawmaking
power.
Some have recommended complete privatization as a simple solution to
eliminate the state’s presence in the stock market.(178) This is premised on the
assumption that the dual role of the state as a shareholder is fraught.(179)
However, state investment agencies and funds do not assume a regulatory
power and they are inherently independent due to the fact that they have
different ownership strategies and different targets.

(178) Pargendler, supra note 6, at 2958.
(179) Id.
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Mixed ownership has been the de facto outcome since the Saudi economy
became structured around the role of the government. The current mixed
ownership invokes the applicable corporate law to govern state affiliates. As
this study argues, government funds and agencies are structurally isolated
from political forces,(180) hence they act in a business like capacity more than as
a government entity. This argument is not without evidence. The improved
performance of the mixed-ownership companies is remarkable. It shows that
wealth maximization is the primary objective of these funds.

(180) See Camara, supra note 93, at 235.
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الدولة كمساهم :دراسة للخصخصة
الجزئية وآثرها ىلع حوكمة الشركات
يف اململكة العربية السعودية
د .مشعل خليل فرج
قسم إدارة األعمال ،كلية االقتصاد والعلوم
اإلدارية -جامعة اإلمام محمد بن سعود
اإلسالمية ،الرياض ،اململكة العربية السعودية

ملخص البحث

دراسات خمتلفة أظهرت أن أداء الرشكات التي متت خصخصتها جزئي ًا وأدرجت
يف سوق األسهم السعودي يتفوق أداؤها عىل أداء منافسيها يف نفس القطاع.
اخلصخصة اجلزئية تتضمن ختيل احلكومة بشكل جزئي عن ملكية الرشكات للقطاع
اخلاص مع احتفاظها باجلزء اآلخر من امللكية ،مما يرتتب عليه حتول احلكومة إىل
مساهم بعد طرح هذه الرشكات لالكتتاب العام .قد تكون اخلصخصة اجلزئية ذات
جدوى اقتصادية ،ولكنها ختلق صعوبات قانونية .دراسات حوكمة الرشكات تقترص
عىل دراسة املسامهني وأعضاء جملس اإلدارة من أشخاص القانون اخلاص .وهيدف
البحث إىل دراسة أثر ملكية احلكومة عىل نظام الرشكات والنظام القضائي املزدوج
املوجود يف اململكة العربية السعودية ،وحتليل األنظمة والسوابق القضائية ملعرفة أي
األنظمة واجبة التطبيق وأي املحاكم التي ينعقد هلا اختصاص النظر يف املنازعات التي
تكون احلكومة طرف ًا فيها كمساهم عادي أو مسيطر.
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ويتوصل البحث إىل أن نظام الرشكات هو النظام الواجب التطبيق عىل املنازعات
التي تكون احلكومة طرف ًا فيها بصفتها مسامه ًا ،وأن املحاكم التجارية هي جهة
االختصاص بنظر هذه املنازعات ،ويقرتح البحث أن يتم تعديل نظام الرشكات
بحيث حيدد مسؤولية املساهم املسيطر عىل أفعاله ،ويناق

البحث الرأي املنادي

بخروج احلكومة من سوق األسهم عن طريق اخلصخصة الكاملة للحصص التي
متتلكها وذلك لتفادي توابع هذا النوع من امللكية ،ويتوصل البحث إىل أن مصلحة
احلكومة كمساهم ال تتعارض مع مصالح املسامهني اآلخرين ،ويويص البحث أال
حيدث تغيري عىل نظام الرشكات بباستنناء مسؤولية املساهم املسيطر والئحة حوكمة
الرشكات لقدرهتام عىل معاجلة هذا النوع من امللكية.
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